Abstract. An important aspect that must be considered when studying opinion formation phenomena is the different social attitude of the agents taking part in the process. Different kinds of interconnections and of interacting behaviours should be associated to the agents depending on their opinion: radicals tend to self-segregate but, on the other hand, have a stronger capacity to convince neutral agents. Other important questions arise when the official media strongly promotes one position. The different perception that each agent has of the official information can lead, in case of monopolistic and aggressive media, to a reaction effect in the population that starts to create massive antagonist clusters.
Introduction
In 1969 Nixon introduced the concept of "silent majority": Demonstrations against the war in Vietnam were taking place all around the US and to enforce his warmonger decision Nixon exploited the neutral, inactive position of the silent majority that was not participating to the riots: those who do not protest support the war. The wrong passage in this argument is the assumption that the silent majority was supporting the war: when a state enters a war, when politicians decide laws, when a company decides a shake-out, when any group has to make a common decision, some people will line up on one position, others will play an antagonist role but the larger part of the people will not decide, simply adopting a neutral position. The delegation mechanism induces people not to have their own opinion on the single topics, to remain inactive in order to avoid conflict and to move the discussion mechanism to higher political levels. The radical position formation, instead, often requires a more or less deep study and documentation phase. This different kind of choice, neutrality vs. radicalism, implies a different communicative attitude between different kinds of agents: while radicals will prefer to be surrounded by people sharing similar ideas, a neutral agent will not have any a priori preclusion in interacting with anybody. On the other side, when a neutral agent interacts with a radical one, the formation process underwent by the radical in the decisional phase will give him bigger chance to have a strong influence on neutral agents. We consider these different communication attitudes and we show that, in absence of external forcing, a pluralistic situation (where many opinions persist) is reached only when the extremists are integrated in the society and strongly consistent on their positions. In presence of media campaigns supporting one of the positions, instead, we find that as the power of the media grows, a secondary antagonist cluster appears to contrast the monopolistic forcing, even in the setting that would have lead to total consensus without media.
Model description
Many model have been constructed to describe opinion formation processes in presence of extremist groups, such as, for example, the one in [3] . We want to consider this kind of analyses, where different rules for social influence are implemented, in a more complete framework where the structure of the social network is also considered. We consider a set of agents with opinion o i randomly extracted in the range [−1, 1]. We term "radical" an agent with opinion near the extremes, and "neutral" an agent with opinion approximatively zero. We start from the assumption that a radical agent will preferentially link to radicals, while neutrals will choose their relationships in a completely random fashion. As for the dynamical part, we refer again to [1] . A tolerance, depending on the opinion, is associated to each agent:
Two agents interact only if |o i − o j | < min(t i , t j ). If the agents interact, an asymmetric shift of the opinion in the radical direction is performed:
The parameter α tunes how the dynamics is sensitive to the opinion difference: if α = 0 we have the standard Deffuant model [2] (at its very critical point), characterised by uniform tolerance and symmetric drift after the interaction. For α = 1 we have the maximum differentiation of the behaviours of the agents: a radical will discuss only with very similar agents and a more extreme position will have a stronger attractive strength in the dynamics. We observe a critical value of the dynamical parameter, α c ≃ 0.8, such that for α < α c the system converges to a single opinion while, for α > α c , the final state shows a larger number of final-state opinions, as is illustrated in the leftmost plots of Fig. 1 . This behaviour is due to the fact that the network structure is strongly correlated to the initial opinions of the agents. Such correlation permits the existence of gradual paths of communication that always lead to convergence. The survival of minority clusters for α > α c is due to the fact that, in this situation, the most extremist agents are not involved in the global opinion dynamics process since their tolerance is too small to interact with someone far from their ideas; they just interact with very similar agents creating a sort of opinion niche. From this reasoning, it follows also that the number of such sub-communities increases with α, while the population of each sub-community decreases.
The media influence
We want to investigate the effect on this model of a strong media campaign supporting one of the two extremal positions. Several mechanisms can explain the media influence on people: it can be considered an indirect effect, like the so called third person effect [4] , where each agent feels the influence of the media on the others and not on herself. Alternatively, it can be considered a direct effect represented by some "Big-Agent" completely connected with the whole network. We will consider only the latter mechanism introducing a "Big-Agent" (BA) with opinion o BA = +1. This agent interacts with all agents at every step of the opinion dynamics (namely, every n agent interactions), with the usual tolerance rule (1) and without changing her opinion at all. The strength of the campaign (sensitive, for example, to whether it is also supported by police repression of the opposite idea) affects the interaction of the media with any agent: we model this persuasive strength by introducing a parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] in the opinion update rule (2):
For ε = 0, the media pressure is null and we find the basic model; as ε grows, the media campaign becomes more aggressive. For any value of ε > 0 the central cluster moves to the BA's opinion, so that the neutral position is no longer represented. The surprising result is that for ε → 1 the size of the biggest cluster (that which supports the BA's opinion) decreases, while a more and more populated antagonist cluster appears near the opposite extreme (Fig. 1 ). This kind of result, where a media influence excessively strong does not lead to consensus, is in agreement with the result previously obtained in [5] for the case of Axelrod model. 
